Intuitions :: Philosophy Judgement Papers

Intuitions This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true. The latter model may, however, legitimize a less a prioristic approach to intuitions. If anything unifies different philosophical methodologies it's some sort of reliance on intuitions. It's remarkable, therefore, how rarely we attempt to justify their employment in philosophy. The intuitions philosophers care about are typically judgements about whether specific (hypothetical or actual) cases are cases of a certain kind. Some philosophical topic such as reference, knowledge or personal identity is under investigation. A theory is proposed and is then tested against our intuitions about specific cases that bear on the topic. In general, if our intuitions contradict what a theory implies about whether, say, S refers to x, or knows that p, or is identical to T, this counts against the theory. If on the other hand, our intuitions match what a theory tells us about particular cases, this usually counts in favor of the theory. All procedures of this sort rest on a principle like I: I Intuitions about specific cases can be used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. This paper is about whether I can be justified. We examine two models, the Concepts Model (CM) and the Belief Model (BM). In our view, neither of them provides a solid foundation for I as it is traditionally applied in philosophy. CM CM has four components: 1. A concept, C, determines what it takes for something to fall under that concept (what it takes for something to be a C). 2. Someone who possesses or grasps a concept, C, doesn't always know explicitly what it takes to be a C because some (maybe most) concepts are understood by us in part tacitly. 3. Intuitions about whether specific cases fall under C are reliably guided by, or generally "match" one's understanding, tacit or otherwise, of C.